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Abstract
The stunning progress in face manipulation methods has
made it possible to synthesize realistic fake face images,
which poses potential threats to our society. It is urgent
to have face forensics techniques to distinguish those tam-
pered images. A large scale dataset FaceForensics++ has
provided enormous training data generated from prominent
face manipulation methods to facilitate anti-fake research.
However, previous works focus more on casting it as a clas-
sification problem by only considering a global prediction.
Through investigation to the problem, we find that training
a classification network often fails to capture high quality
features, which might lead to sub-optimal solutions. In this
paper, we zoom in on the problem by conducting a pixel-
level analysis, i.e. formulating it as a pixel-level segmen-
tation task. By evaluating multiple architectures on both
segmentation and classification tasks, We show the supe-
riority of viewing the problem from a segmentation per-
spective. Different ablation studies are also performed to
investigate what makes an effective and efficient anti-fake
model. Strong baselines are also established, which, we
hope, could shed some light on the field of face forensics.
1. Introduction
Human faces play an important role in human commu-
nication, as a face is associated with the identity of a per-
son. The unique face information, working as fingerprints,
has been used in many applications such as phone unlock-
ing, payment, etc., thanks to remarkable progress in face
detection and recognition systems [45, 41, 37]. However,
we have also seen stunning progress in image and video
manipulation methods, which enable editing the images or
videos in a visually plausible way. Some face specific ma-
nipulation methods [1, 3, 46, 47] are able to manipulate the
face image of person and create an indistinguishable fake
image. Current face manipulation methods can be roughly
divided into two categories, facial reenactment and identity
swap. Facial reenactment tries to transfer the facial expres-
Image Cls Seg GT
Figure 1: Predictions of a classification network and a seg-
mentation network. The second image is the activation map
of the classification network showing the high-response
area. The third is the heatmap given by the segmentation
network. Compared with the ground-truth on the right, the
segmentation network localizes the tampered pixels on a far
accurate level.
sions of one person to another person and synthesize real-
istic details. Face2Face [47] and NeuralTextures [46] are
two representative works. Identity swap is a technique that
enables replacing the face of a person with another person’s
face. Deepfakes [1] and FaceSwap [3] are two of the most
prominent methods. These methods enable effortless cre-
ation of fake face images and videos, which poses potential
threats to our society. For example, fake news can be easily
created by synthesizing a speech video of a politician [43].
To alleviate the potential issues caused by the fake face
videos and images, great efforts have been dedicated to the
field of face forensics, which aims to determine authenticity
of a face photo. General image forensics techniques, rely-
ing on hand-crafted cues [18, 33, 8, 30], might not be suit-
able for face specific forensics tasks since faces are highly
structured data. Recent works take advantage of great repre-
sentation power of CNNs (Convolutional Neural Networks)
and train a network using a large dataset containing authen-
tic and manipulated face images [36, 4, 49, 9]. In [36], a
large scale dataset called “FaceForensics++” is released to
address the problem of face forensics. The dataset contains
5,000 videos generated from 4 popular face manipulation
methods, Deefakes, FaceSwap, Face2Face and NeuralTex-
tures, which provides rich data to train models as well as a
standard benchmark for evaluation.
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Most methods for face forensics cast the problem as a
classification problem, in which given an image the model
is expected to determine whether it is a real face or a manip-
ulated face. Using deep networks has been proved effective
in dealing with such a classification problem [36, 49]. In
[36], a modified Xception network [11] is trained on “Face-
Forensics++” dataset and achieves remarkable results, ac-
curacy of 99.26 on the raw data. In [4], a compact net-
work also achieves comparable performance. However, one
question is raised: “Is the problem well-defined?” or “Is it
a good definition of the problem?” In Figure 2, the second
image shows the activation map of a classification model re-
vealing the high response area for the fake face on the left.
It is obviously that the activation map is not actually consis-
tent with the ground-truth, which suggests that the features
used to distinguish the fake images might have weak corre-
lation to the real manipulated regions.
The example implies one of the limitations of a classifi-
cation network that it can only produce a global scalar value
representing the confidence of being fake but can not reflect
the degree of how the image is manipulated. It would be
more beneficial to have a pixel-level output that accurately
reflects the manipulated pixels, as shown in the third image
of Figure 2. Therefore, It would be more natural to formu-
late the problem of face forensics as a semantic segmenta-
tion task so that the model is forced to learn discriminative
features to localize manipulated regions.
In this paper, we analyze the problem of face forensics
from a pixel-level perspective using segmentation methods
to complement the existing classification methods for face
forensics. There are some questions that are still under in-
vestigated such as: 1) By nature, whether face forensics is a
classification or segmentation problem? 2) What is the most
suitable network architecture for this problem? 3) Should
we adopt shallow or deep networks? 4) Should we train the
model from scratch or initialize it using general vision fea-
tures. We conduct experiments to try to answer these ques-
tions. By evaluating various architectures, we compare the
performance of the segmentation networks and their coun-
terpart classification networks from different aspects. We
hope to provide more insight to the problem and establish a
new baseline for the benchmark.
Our contributions are three folds:
• We conduct a pixel-level analysis to the problem of
face forensics by using segmentation methods to be
complementary to the existing classification methods.
• By redefining the problem to be a pixel-level task, we
evaluate various architectures and create a strong new
baseline for the problem.
• By performing different ablation studies, we analyze
what makes an effective and efficient anti-fake model,
which, we hope, can shed some light on the field of
research.
2. Related Work
We cover the most important related papers in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
2.1. Digital Face Manipulation
A comprehensive state-of-the-art report of digital face
manipulation can be found in [52]. Current facial ma-
nipulation methods can be separated into four categories:
image-based approach, Audio-based approach, computer-
graphics-based approach as well as learning based ap-
proach.
State of the Arts image-based approaches such as Video
Rewrite [10], Video Face Replacement [5], Bringing Por-
traits to Life [7] and Deep Video Portraits [24]. These
methods employ 2D warps to deform the image to match
the expressions of a source actor. Synthesizing Obama [42]
learned the mapping between audio and lip motions.
State-of-the-arts computer-graphics-based approaches
such as Video Face Replacement [16], VDub [19] an
Face2Face [47]. These methods usually reconstruct 3D
models using blendshapes or other mesh editing process,
based on high-quality 3D face capturing techniques as well
as precise and rapid tracking techniques.
Recently, generative adversarial networks (GANs) are
used to apply different facial attributes such as Aging [6],
viewpoints [21], skin color [28], smiling [48], or other es-
sential computer graphic renderings [24], which are imple-
mented as an image-to-image translation, applying a patch-
based GAN-loss.
2.2. Face forensics
Face forensics aims to ensure authenticity and origin
of the face. Face forensics identify computer generated
characters from computer graphics faces [4], print-scanned
morphed faces [34], face splicing [15, 22], face swapping
[51, 4], and face reenactment [4, 17]. Specific artifacts aris-
ing from the synthesis process such as color , texture [15]
or eye blinking [26] can also be exploited. Learning-based
approach propose a deep network trained to capture the sub-
tle inconsistencies arising from low-level and/or high level
features[4, 51]. Particularly, [20] uses a convolutional neu-
ral network to extract frame-level features,which are then
used to train a recurrent neural network (RNN) that learns
to classify if a video has been subject to manipulation or
not. These approaches show impressive results, but can not
precisely locate the manipulated area.
2.3. Pixel-level task
Instead of a rough prediction in global image-level view,
there are many works towards to provide a local or pixel-
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Figure 2: Pipeline of classification task. Different colors of arrows indicate different stages. Blue is for the training stage,
Green is for the inference stage. When the classification score is above 0.5, it is classified as a fake image and is further
processed to get the manipulated regions. When the score is below 0.5, indicating a real image, an all-zero mask is produced.
level prediction, such as Unet [35], fully convolutional net-
work (FCN)[27], Deeplab.for semantic segmentation. As
for image generation, pix2pix [23] realize the pixel-level
transformation between different domains. There are lots
of application concerning face parsing[29], pose parsing or
scene segmentation.
As for face forensics, the mainstream methods are based
on global classification at present, we drive the segmenta-
tion motivation of face manipulation to predict the region
of local manipulation area. The face is often occluded by
objects, but the face in the database [36] is generally unob-
structed, so it can be trained directly.
3. Problem Setting
In this section, we first introduce the problem settings
and methodologies for both the classification task and the
segmentation task. Then we present an overview of the ar-
chitectures used for evaluation.
3.1. Classification Task
We first revisit the classification task. Formally Let x ∈
RH×W×3 represent an image containing either an real or a
tampered face, and l ∈ {0, 1} represent the label associated
to it. We learn a mapping function f(·) : RH×W×3 →
{0, 1} to predict the authenticity of a face image. Given a
dataset {(xt, lt)}Tt=1 containing T images, the network is
trained by the following BCE (Binary Cross Entropy) loss:
Lcls = − 1
T
T∑
t=1
(1− lt) log(pt) + lt log(pt) (1)
where pt is the output of the network for tth sample.
Since a classification network can only map an image to
a scalar indicating the probability of an image being tam-
pered, It is unclear whether the model has learned useful
features to localize the manipulated regions. There are some
interpretation and visualization works trying to reveal more
information from a classification network by investigating
the activated regions on featuremaps. [13, 31, 50, 38] We
adopt the most representative method, CAM (Class Activa-
tion Map), to help visualize what the model has learned.
CAM requires the network has an average pooling
layer before the classifier, which collapses the output of
the last convolution layer to a single vector. Suppose
the featuremaps from the last convolution layer is F ∈
RHf×Wf×K ; the classifier has weight w ∈ RK×1; the acti-
vation map M ∈ RHf×Wf of a tampered face is calculated
as:
Mij =
∑
k
Fijk · wk (2)
where Mij , Fijk and wk are entries of M, F and w re-
spectively.
What Equation 2 does is actually apply the classifier di-
rectly to the featuremaps F, which performs classification
on each spatial location. For simplicity, we modify the orig-
inal CAM setting by switching the average pooling layer
and the classifier. As shown in Figure 2, the activation map
M can be viewed as a dense prediction output for the image
and the classification score is actually produced by averag-
ing the activation map to a scalar.
In order to convert M to a pixel-level mask, we need to
further normalize it to the range of 0 to 1 and quantize it
using a threshold. The normalization is operated as:
M˜ =
M−min(M)
max[M−min(M)] (3)
The final pixel-level prediction is generated as:
S = I{M˜ ≥ τ1} (4)
where I(·) is a indicator function and τ1 a threshold.
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Now we have a pixel-level output that highlights the ma-
nipulated regions. Using these outputs makes it easier to
investigate and analyze how well the classification model is
able to learn discriminative and high-quality features on a
pixel-level. Details and analysis are described in Section 4.
Figure 3: Pipeline of segmentation task. The network pre-
dicts a pixel-level output and is supervised directly by a
pixel-level mask.
3.2. Segmentation Task
A classification network has limited capability to local-
ize manipulated regions with a pixel-level manner because
it is supervised only by a global label. Segmentation ex-
tends the task to a dense classification problem by assigning
a label to each pixel of an image. The model is then forced
to learn discriminative features to determine the authentic-
ity of each pixel. Formally, the supervision for an image is
defined as a mask y ∈ {0, 1}H×W instead of a single label
and the loss is imposed on each pixel:
Lseg = − 1
T
T∑
t=1
H∑
i=1
W∑
j=1
(1− ytij) log(ptij) + ytij log(ptij)
(5)
where ytij and p
t
ij are the label and the prediction respec-
tively for tth sample at position (i, j).
Since a segmentation task requires pixel-level mask
as supervision, annotation of the data is usually time-
consuming. For example, as mentioned in [14], a high-
resolution street view image for semantic segmentation re-
quires around 1.5 hours for labelling. Fortunately for the
face forensics task, the mask can be easily calculated by
checking the pixel difference between the original image
and the forged image without any extra annotation cost.
Figure 4 shows some training images from “FaceForen-
sics++” dataset as well as their corresponding mask indi-
cating the manipulated area.
A classification network can be easily converted to a
FCN (Fully Convolutional Network) [27] where the fully
connected layers are replaced by convolutional layers. The
pipeline for training a segmentation network is illustrated
in Figure 3. Compared with the classification task in Fig-
ure 2, the main difference is that the average pooling is
dropped and the BCE loss is directly applied to each pixel.
The pixel-level prediction can be directly obtained from the
trained model.
F2F NT P DF FS
Figure 4: Illustration of example images and the corre-
sponding masks for the “FaceForensics++” dataset. (P:
Pristine, DF: DeepFakes, F2F: Face2Face, FS: FaceSwap,
NT: NeuralTextures)
A segmentation model can be also evaluated from a
global classification perspective by aggregating the dense
prediction:
lˆ = I{ 1
HW
H∑
i=1
W∑
j=1
yˆij ≥ τ2} (6)
where yˆij represents the prediction at position (i, j) and
τ2 is the threshold.
In this way, we are able to make fair comparison be-
tween a segmentation network and its counterpart classifi-
cation network under classification metrics. With extensive
experiments in Section 4, we show the superiority of the
segmentation networks for the face forensics task.
3.3. Architectures
In order to conduct deep analysis on the classification
and segmentation task, we choose several representative ar-
chitectures to evaluate the effectiveness on the problem of
face forensics.
Xception [12] is a deep network architecture constructed
by a series of modified inception modules [44] where the
depthwise separable convolution is used. There are totally
36 convolutional layers involved to form the feature extrac-
tion base of the network. The architecture is adopted in [36]
for the classification task of face forensics.
MesoInception-4 [4] is a compact and light-weight net-
work to address the problem of face forensics. It consists
of two inception modules followed by two classic convo-
lutional layers with maxpooling layers. We replace the all
the operations after the last batchnorm layer with a single
convolutional layer as the classifier.
UNet [35] is an effective and popular architecture for pixel-
level tasks such as segmentation and pixel-to-pixel trans-
lation [23]. A Unet is basically defined by an encoder,
consisting of convolutional layers and downsampling op-
erations, and a decoder, consisting of convolutional layers
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and upsampling operations. There are skip connections be-
tween the encoder and the decoder to enable passing infor-
mation from low-level features. We choose two variants
of UNet with different downsampling times in the encoder.
UNet8x and UNet4x are downsampled by 8 and 4 times
respectively.
VGG16 [39] is a classic deep network for recognition tasks,
which consists of 16 convolutional layers. Since we found
the full network fails to converge on face forensics tasks, we
only use two shallow versions VGG8 and VGG5, contain-
ing the first 7 and 4 feature layers of vgg respectively and a
classifier.
FN3 is a 3-layer network we design to explore the potential
of shallow networks. This architecture only contains two
“Conv-BN-ReLU” blocks, and a 3 × 3 convolutional layer
as the classifier. The first two convolutional layers are with
kernel size 7 and stride 2. It is interesting that this minimum
structure works surprisingly good, even outperforming most
of those deep architectures. Please refer to Section 4 for
more details.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experiment Setup
DF F2F FS NT P Avg
Xception-cls 99.16 98.35 98.88 99.09 99.18 98.93
Mesonet-cls 93.33 77.01 26.77 92.05 88.99 75.63
UNet8x-cls 56.57 33.4 22.96 47.21 92.55 50.5
UNet4x-cls 66.9 45.45 37.48 55.42 98.98 60.8
VGG7-cls 41.69 73.37 67.78 38.81 76.45 59.6
VGG4-cls 56.02 84.92 90.72 40.33 70.66 68.53
Conv3-cls 94.35 93.28 81.13 94.26 61.43 84.89
Xception-seg 96.45 97.98 99.02 98.39 99.92 98.35
Mesonet-seg 68.86 79.58 89.77 96.92 59.56 78.94
UNet8x-seg 99.08 98.74 97.17 99.42 66.65 92.21
UNet4x-seg 98.61 97.32 99.05 96.53 97.01 97.70
VGG7-seg 98.41 98.34 99.05 99.01 99.33 98.83
VGG4-seg 98.24 98.29 99.03 99.01 99.99 98.91
Conv3-seg 98.16 98.32 99.03 99.06 99.99 98.91
Table 1: Classification accuracy on different manipulation
methods. (P: Pristine, DF: DeepFakes, F2F: Face2Face, FS:
FaceSwap, NT: NeuralTextures)
Dataset: FaceForensics++ [36] is a large scale face foren-
sics dataset consisting of 5,000 video clips in total. Video
sequences are crawled from the internet and a manual
screening is adopted to ensure high quality and avoid face
occlusion, resulting in 1,000 original videos. Four manipu-
lation methods, Deepfakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap and Neu-
ralTextures, are applied to create forged videos, resulting in
4,000 fake clips. The dataset also provides data with three
different compression levels, raw, HQ and LQ. We only fo-
cus on the raw quality task because low quality videos usu-
ally suffer from strong loss of visual and identity informa-
tion, which might not cause abuse as those clear ones. [36]
also suggests a split of 720 videos for training, 140 for val-
idation as well as testing. We follow the same setting.
Evaluation protocol and metrics: In [36], there are two
types of training protocols involved, method specific train-
ing and mixed training. The former involves forged data
from only one of the manipulation methods. The latter re-
quires training a model with all the real and forged data and
the performance is evaluated on each specific method. We
only adopt mixed training as it poses a more challenging
task and real scenario. The evaluation is frame-based, there-
fore we extract all frames for the training set and partial
frames for validation and testing (every 10 frames).
In terms of evaluation metrics, we use classification ac-
curacy for the classification tasks, which represents how
many test images are correctly classified. For segmentation
tasks, IoU (Intersection over Union) is used to represent the
ratio of TPTP+FP+TN , where TP (True Positive), FP (False
Positive) and TN (True Negative) are calculated based on
pixels. The IoU is calculated for both foreground and back-
ground, denoted as Fg-IoU and Bg-IoU. The two IoUs are
averaged to get mIoU, the mean IoU.
Implementation details: In face forensics, faces are the
most important regions. As shown in [36], the model
trained with the whole images performs poorly. Therefore,
instead of using the whole image, we extract the faces as
a pre-processing step using a public face detection tool [2]
and only use the face regions to train the models . In or-
der to include more background information, we enlarge the
bounding box to the scale of 2. The segmentation masks
are calculated by checking the difference between a manip-
ulated face image and its corresponding original image. For
segmentation tasks, the images are randomly cropped by
size 256x256 and the same operation is applied to the cor-
responding mask to get the cropped mask. For classifica-
tion tasks, it is necessary to include most face regions in the
crop. Therefore, the shorter dimension of the image is first
resized to 256, then a patch of 256x256 is cropped from the
resized image.
The implementation is based on PyTorch [32]. All the
models are trained using the Adam [25] optimizer with pa-
rameters β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999. Since the Adam opti-
mizer can adjust the learning rate dynamically, we only set
the default learning rate to 10−3 and do not use any learning
rate decay policies. The batchsize is set to 64.
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mIoU Bg-IoU Fg-IoU
DF F2F FS NT P Avg DF F2F FS NT P Avg DF F2F FS NT P Avg
Xception-seg 89.32 88.18 87.7 62.81 99.95 85.59 95.95 93.79 94.19 41.94 99.95 85.16 82.7 82.56 81.21 83.67 - 82.54
Mesonet-seg 56.58 51.14 54.52 40.23 90.2 58.53 78.96 71.06 74.68 22.02 90.2 67.38 34.19 31.21 34.35 58.44 - 39.55
UNet8x-seg 87.83 86.97 85.02 50.51 86.02 79.27 94.7 92.32 91.82 28.27 86.02 78.63 80.96 81.62 78.22 72.75 - 78.39
UNet4x-seg 89.12 89.43 86.29 51.46 96.09 82.48 95.41 93.89 92.59 30.68 96.09 81.73 82.82 84.96 79.99 72.25 - 80.00
VGG8-seg 94.68 95.21 94.33 76.04 99.31 91.91 97.87 97.34 97.19 59.42 99.31 90.23 91.48 93.07 91.47 92.67 - 92.17
VGG5-seg 95.78 96.21 94.81 75.6 99.86 92.45 98.36 97.94 97.51 58.97 99.86 90.53 93.21 94.48 92.11 92.23 - 93.01
FN3-seg 92.68 93.05 89.01 64.42 99.72 87.78 97.16 96.24 94.81 43.89 99.72 86.36 88.21 89.86 83.21 84.95 - 86.56
Xception-cls 47.6 58.98 56.21 58.83 99.23 64.17 59.9 71.9 75.62 23.27 99.23 65.98 35.3 46.06 36.8 52.95 - 42.78
Mesonet-cls 45.96 37.14 37.48 24.78 95.46 48.16 67.87 55.75 65.08 13.93 95.46 59.62 24.05 18.53 9.88 35.63 - 22.02
UNet8x-cls 23 33.6 34.82 29.71 86.39 41.5 28.63 49.62 53.8 11.3 86.39 45.94 17.42 17.58 15.84 48.11 - 24.74
UNet4x-cls 22.3 32.95 34.38 35.14 97.59 44.47 26.25 46.11 51.92 13.99 97.59 47.17 18.35 19.79 16.83 56.29 - 27.82
VGG8-cls 28.73 23.45 26.12 29.84 63.66 34.36 40.91 21.65 30.72 12.1 63.66 33.81 16.54 25.25 21.51 47.57 - 27.72
VGG5-cls 39.18 37.92 38.85 15.73 80.39 42.41 66.81 63.83 69.56 13.51 80.39 58.82 11.56 12.01 8.14 17.96 - 12.42
FN3-cls 16.77 18.46 20.47 43.84 48.68 29.64 14.58 10.63 17.9 8.09 48.68 19.97 18.97 26.29 23.04 79.59 - 36.97
Table 2: Segmentation results for different architectures. (P: Pristine, DF: DeepFakes, F2F: Face2Face, FS: FaceSwap, NT:
NeuralTextures)
4.2. Experimental Results
Classification task: Table 1 shows the classification ac-
curacy of different architectures. The suffixes “-seg” and
“-cls” represent a segmentation model and a classification
model respectively. The pixel-wise output is aggregated to
a global output according to Equation 6. From the scores of
the classification models, Xception-cls reaches the best per-
formance, which is consistent with [36]. It can be seen that
UNet, as a popular segmentation model for various pixel-
level prediction tasks, fails to perform well in the classi-
fication task. it is interesting to see that FN3-cls, a mini-
mum structure with only 3 layer works surprisingly good.
Although, the performance is lower than Xception, FN3-
cls achieves far better performance than other models. For
those segmentation models, it can be easily noticed that
they obtain better classification results than their counter-
part classification models, which shows the benefit of train-
ing models under pixel-level supervision.
Segmentation task: Table 2 shows the segmentation re-
sults of different architectures. The classification models
are trained using a global image-level label and visualized
by the CAM to get a pixel-level output, explained in Sec-
tion 3.1. For segmentation models, VGG5-seg achieves the
best performance in terms of both mIoU, Bg-IoU, and Fg-
IoU. Mesonet-seg, as a compact and efficient architecture,
does not achieve comparable results, outperformed by other
methods by a large margin. We suspect it could be due
to the limited capacity of the model. It is also worth not-
ing that UNet still does not reach promising results as a
popular segmentation architecture. On the contrary, the 3-
layer network FN3-seg shows better potential, even better
than Xception-seg. For classification models, Xception-cls
achieves the best results in most of the scores, which im-
plies that Xception-cls can successfully learn high-quality
features to locate manipulated regions even trained with a
global image-level label. However, Xception-cls can be
hardly compared with its segmentation counterpart that ob-
tains far higher scores. The rest of the classification models
all suffer from low scores. Even VGG5-cls, whose segmen-
tation counterpart achieves the best results, is unable to pro-
duce plausible predictions without pixel-level supervision.
From the results above, obviously segmentation models
show superiority over the classification models in terms of
both pixel-level prediction and global-level prediction. Fig-
ure 5 shows outputs of different architectures, which further
illustrates the benefit of analyzing fake faces on a pixel-
level.
4.3. Analysis
Deep vs Shallow
To explore the effect of model depth to the task of face
forensics, we also take a closer look at the performance of
models with different depth. In Table 3, we summarize the
mIoUs of segmentation models with different depth. Apart
from VGG8 and VGG5, we also include VGG3, which only
uses the first two layers of VGG16 followed by a classifier.
It is interesting to see that the deep model, Xception with 36
layers, does not reach to a high score, whereas the shallow
models present better abilities. This reveals that face foren-
sics is supposed to be defined as a low-level vision problem
than a high-level perception problem.
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DF
F2F
FS
NT
Image&GT Xception Mesonet UNet8x UNet4x VGG8 VGG5 FN3
Figure 5: Qualitative results of the classification and segmentation models. Each of two rows relates to a specific manipulation
method. For each method, on the left are the input fake image and the ground-truth indicating the manipulated area. The
upper row shows the pixel-level results of all the classification models, and the lower row displays the predictions of the
segmentation models. (DF: DeepFakes, F2F: Face2Face, FS: FaceSwap, NT: NeuralTextures)
Pretrained or From Scratch
As implied by the analysis in the last section, face foren-
sics is more like a low-level vision task. Another question
is that “can the models benefit from the features used for
general vision recognition tasks?” We conduct another ab-
lation study where we compare the performance on the seg-
mentation task using models with and without ImageNet-
pretraining. The results are shown in Table 4. According
to the numbers, there is little difference between the pre-
trained model and the trained-from-scratch model. The fea-
tures learned in a general vision recognition task such as
ImageNet did not help quickly find a better local optima.
Kernel visualization
In order to have a better understanding of the features
learned by the model, we analyze the kernels by visualiz-
ing them using the technique in [40]. In Figure 6, for each
fake image, we visualize two kernels in each convolutional
layer. Apart from the features in conv1, which are mostly
low-level edges and corners, the kernels in following lay-
ers do not make much sense to us humans. Intuitively, the
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Image & GT conv1 conv2 conv3 conv4
Figure 6: Kernel visualization of VGG5. The left column is the input fake image and the ground-truth. Each column on the
right shows kernels from a specific convolutional layer.
DF F2F FS NT P Avg
Xception (36) 89.32 88.18 87.7 62.81 99.95 85.59
VGG8 (7) 94.68 95.21 94.33 76.04 99.31 91.91
VGG5 (4) 95.78 96.21 94.81 75.6 99.86 92.45
FN3 (3) 92.68 93.05 89.01 64.42 99.72 87.78
VGG3 (3) 88.79 89.92 79.65 57.93 96.64 82.58
Table 3: Comparison among models with different depth.
The number in the parentheses indicates the depth of the
model. The numbers are mIoU.
model tries to learn subtle features, to which humans are not
sensitive to. Humans are good at recognizing things on a se-
mantic level, but fake faces, generated by advanced manip-
ulation methods, seem beyond humans ability. This further
emphasizes the demand of a good face forensics model.
5. Conclusion
Face forensics has become increasingly important as
face manipulation methods have made stunning progress to
enable effortless generation of indistinguishable fake face
images. Most previous works cast the problem as a clas-
DF F2F FS NT P Avg
Xception (pretrained) 89.32 88.18 87.7 62.81 99.95 85.59
Xception (non-pretrained) 88.72 87.88 88.70 62.84 99.74 85.57
VGG5 (pretrained) 95.78 96.21 94.81 75.6 99.86 92.45
VGG5 (non-pretrained) 95.69 96.2 94.75 75.35 99.86 92.37
VGG8 (pretrained) 94.68 95.21 94.33 76.04 99.31 91.91
VGG8 (non-pretrained) 95.67 95.93 95.06 75.18 99.83 92.33
Table 4: Comparison between a pretrained model and the
model trained from scratch. The numbers are mIoU.
sification task, which suffers from limitations. In this pa-
per, we analyze the problem from pixel-level perspective by
using segmentation methods to complement the traditional
classification methods. With comprehensive experiments,
we show the superiority of formulating it as a segmentation
problem instead of a classification problem. In addition, we
also perform different ablation studies to analyze the im-
portant factors of being an effective face forensics model,
which establishes a strong new baseline for the benchmark.
We hope that our analysis can provide more insight to the
field of face forensics.
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